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DESTABILIZING DUE PROCESS AND EVOLUTIVE
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William N. Eskridge, Jr.
One way to think about the relationship between the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is to view due process as
backward-looking (evaluating a law in light of its historical precedents), and equal
protection as forward-looking (evaluating a law in light of its utility for future
social projects). Professor Eskridge challenges this contrast. He shows that such
a contrast is supported by neither the text and history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor by the Supreme Court's precedents applying the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. Due process is just as often destabilizing as equal protection,
which like due process often defers to past practices.
Notwithstanding the analytical vacuity of the backward-looking/forward-looking
contrast, the two clauses display potentially different roles for minority groups: The
Due Process Clause secures libertarian protections at the retail (individual) level
that are important when the group is socially despised, while the Equal Protection
Clause potentially offers minorities wholesale (group) level protections when (or
if) the Court recognizes their legitimacy as partners in American pluralist democracy.
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Kenneth Karst argues that the Constitution prohibits the state from treat-
ing members of socially stigmatized groups as outsiders to the law or from
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. I have learned much from
Ken Karst throughout my academic career, and his comments on this Article have been character-
istically illuminating.
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denying them "full inclusion in the public life of the community."1 Elabo-
rating on this principle, Karst has been the legal academy's most articulate
critic of laws denying full inclusion to lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. He
has criticized laws criminalizing consensual sodomy, such as the one upheld
by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 and the rule excluding bisex-
ual and gay persons from the armed forces that was tolerated in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Watkins v. United
States Army and upheld in subsequent courts of appeals decisions.4 Most of
his work is an exegesis of the Equal Protection Clause, the basis for the Watkins
challenge to the armed forces exclusion. Yet Karst also sees due process, the
basis for the Hardwick challenge to sodomy laws, as an integral part of the
constitutional regulation of the legislature's "tendency to coerce confor-
mity," which courts should criticize as part of their mission "to maintain our
sense of belonging to a network of connection that includes the whole
nation."5 Under Karst's theory, Hardwick was wrong.'
But if Hardwick is governing precedent for the proposition that the
Constitution allows the state to criminalize consensual sodomy, does that
mean that the Constitution also allows the state to exclude gay people from
the'armed forces and elsewhere? Starting from a similar inclusionary base-
line as Karst, Cass Sunstein in 1988 argued against the latter proposition,
for a narrow reason and a broad one. The narrow reason was that Hardwick
formally did not present an equal protection issue, which is analytically sepa-
rate from due process. The military, Sunstein maintained, might prohibit
consensual sodomy and yet still be barred from excluding people it thinks
1. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 193-94 (1993) (analyzing Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), a due process abortion case).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), criticized in KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 201-06, 227 (1989).
3. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), withdrawing 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). The
concurring opinion in Watkins, by Judge William A. Norris, would have invalidated the exclusion,
notwithstanding Hardwick. See id. at 711-31 (Norris, J., concurring). The en banc decision left the
policy in place but ruled it could not be applied to Sgt. Perry J. Watkins for estoppel reasons. See id.
at 710-11.
4. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has subsequently joined other courts of
appeals, for example, Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), in upholding the
current version of the exclusionary policy. See Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126
(9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the military's "don't ask/don't tell" policy), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067
(1999). The best critique of this antigay exclusion is Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and
the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991).
5. KARST, supra note 2, at 226.
6. See id. at 227.
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likely to violate that prohibition,7 the position that Judge William A. Norris
had earlier staked out in Watkins.8 The broad reason was that due process and
equal protection serve different constitutional roles.
The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to
the Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored conven-
tion, described at the appropriate level of generality, is violated by the
practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause
looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were ... expected
to endure.9
This thesis has the virtue not only of confining the constitutional damage of
Hardwick, but also of defending the Court's subsequent decision in Romer v.
Evans,'" which invalidated a state antigay initiative on equal protection
grounds." From a Karstian perspective, however, the thesis has the vice of
allowing Hardwick to survive Evans and, more broadly, of divorcing the Due
Process Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment's core principle of equal
citizenship.
Setting aside the narrow issue of whether Hardwick and Evans can ulti-
mately be reconciled, 2 consider Sunstein's broader claim. The idea that the
Due Process Clause as applied by the judiciary is generally backward-looking,
while the Equal Protection Clause is generally forward-looking, is an impor-
tant thesis. Is it right?
As an abstract matter it is hard to see why there should be this kind of
difference between the methodologies for applying due process and equal
protection guarantees, as both clauses strike me as being strongly present-
looking, with backward- as well as forward-looking arguments being relevant
to each clause. Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court's constructions of the
Fourteenth Amendment support the distinction between backward-looking
due process and forward-looking equal protection. At first glance, though,
the Court's precedents do not support this distinction. While due process
cases emphasize the nation's traditions, they also emphasize the critical bite
tradition-inspired principles can have for longstanding as well as novel legal
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1164-70 (1988).
8. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711-31 (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1163. For the explication of this proposition, see id. at 1170-78.
10. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11. See id. at 635. Evans did not mention, much less distinguish, Hardwick. For critique, see id.
at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Although Evans does not overrule Hardwick, even implicitly, the two decisions are, in
my view, ultimately irreconcilable. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 150-51, 209-11 (1999).
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practices. While the equal protection cases sometimes unsettle traditional
baselines, they usually defer to them. Most interestingly, the constitutional
experience of lesbian and gay litigants-the occasion for Sunstein's
generalization-has been contrary to the thesis and supports a different
understanding: a frequently destabilizing due process that offers marginalized
Americans multiple points of challenge to traditional exclusionary and persecu-
tory state practices at the retail level, which is complemented by an evolutive
equal protection that offers such groups the possibility that, if traditional norms
against them weaken, the judiciary will force the political process to clean
up remaining exclusionary policies on a wholesale level.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION METHODOLOGIES
Academics and judges who believe that constitutional interpretation
must be faithful to the original meaning of constitutional texts are unlikely
to distinguish the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; such thinkers
will generally emphasize backward-looking considerations for both." For
such traditionalists, the Fourteenth Amendment assures us that legal innova-
tions will not diminish the liberties and equalities our people have tradition-
ally enjoyed, but it has little critical bite for longstanding practices that current
skeptics consider unjust. Academics and judges who believe that constitu-
tional interpretation must be faithful to normative visions of justice and
citizenship are also unlikely to distinguish between the clauses; such think-
ers will generally emphasize forward-looking considerations in both due process
and equal protection cases.14 For such progressives, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment authorizes judges to be critics of longstanding as well as novel legal
rules and practices and to set new baselines grounded in current concep-
13. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95-96, 96 n.1, 102-03 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding federal job
discrimination against gay people on the authority of Hardwick); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 75-77, 143-45, 154-55 (1990);
EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM, INTERVENTIONISM, AND
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
14. In addition to KARST, supra note 1, see, for example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
137-41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Consditu-
tiors and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); and Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity
in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
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tions of justice that can trump tradition and history. The distinction between
backward-looking due process and forward-looking equal protection is unlikely
to be persuasive for either traditionalists or progressives, who are driven by
their methodological commitments to reject the idea, at least rhetorically.
The thesis is most relevant to centrist professors and judges who con-
sider both tradition and justice pertinent to constitutional theory, and who
emphasize that the rule of law includes the Court's precedents and the princi-
ples they contain.15 For such pragmatists, the Fourteenth Amendment requires
judges to examine novel as well as traditional legal rules and practices to
determine whether they are consistent with precedent and the ongoing nor-
mative enterprise of judicial review. Pragmatic thinkers ought to be open
to the argument that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses serve
different preservative and critical functions, respectively, and that those dif-
ferent functions are reflected in the Court's precedents. The remainder of
this essay will suggest reasons why precedent-emphasizing centrists, too, ought
to be skeptical of the thesis.
A. The General Structure and Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment announces that "[aill per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States... are citizens" of this coun-
try and the state in which they live.16 Section one then says that states cannot
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 7 On the face of it, neither of these latter clauses seems more forward-
or backward-looking than the other; both clauses seem present-looking.
Each contemplates a current norm to which the state should presumptively
conform when it deprives any particular person of his or her rights. The Due
Process Clause announces a procedural norm. If the state is doing something
that triggers my rights under the clause, then it has an obligation to give me
the normal process appropriate to my situation and deprivation. Courts
have long construed the clause to carry with it some substantive norms as
15. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1996). A judicial exemplar is Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Id.
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well, thereby demanding a fit between the reasonableness of the deprivation
(whatever the process) and the "law of the land."'8 The Equal Protection
Clause requires the state to justify any difference in procedural or substantive
treatment of one person vis- -vis another. In short, the Due Process Clause
demands a reasonable process and basis for state action that hurts my inter-
ests, while the Equal Protection Clause demands a reasonable basis for state
action that hurts my interests but not yours. Karst has argued that both clauses
subserve the goal of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment-to
guarantee citizenship."
That both provisions look immediately to the present law of the land does
not mean that neither looks backward or forward-only that there is no
inherent reason to think that one is predominantly backward-looking and
the other predominantly forward-looking. Backward-looking considerations-
traditional legal values and practices-are relevant to both clauses." A long-
standing history of state practice supports claims that a state rule is both
nonarbitrary (due process) and nondiscriminatory (equal protection). That
support is attenuated if the challengers have a cogent normative indictment of
the past practices, such as a showing that they have produced or are producing
unjustified bad consequences. Thus, forward-looking considerations-critical
arguments-are also relevant to arguments under both clauses.
Suppose the state deprives anyone arrested for sodomy of his or her
right to vote. Such a rule might be challenged as an arbitrary deprivation of
an important due process liberty, or as a violation of equal protection, or as
both. Whatever the basis for challenge, both backward- and forward-looking
arguments will be relevant. Surely it is pertinent to know, for equal protec-
tion as well as due process purposes, whether such laws have been common
in the Anglo-American tradition, what motivated legislatures to adopt them,
and how they have worked." Longstanding enforcement of such laws con-
tributes something to their validity under either clause. It is also pertinent
18. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Edwin S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due
Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911).
19. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1977) (drawing from CHARLES BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-66 (1969)).
20. Similarly, both clauses reflect American traditions. Cass R. Sunstein recognizes that due
process fairness has deep resonance in our history, but he neglects our equally deep historical
tradition of equal treatment. See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245
(1983).
21. Such laws were common earlier in American history, but they required conviction, not
just arrest, for sodomy. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (deciding the constitu-
tionality of a statute disenfranchising anyone convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, including
sodomy).
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to consider, for due process as well as equal protection purposes, the effect of
such a law on the future operation of the democracy and the justice of applying
such a law to exclude people who have been objects of police attention
because of their gender or sexual orientation.2 A persuasive argument that
such laws are counterproductive or unjust contributes something to their
invalidity under either clause. The precise weighing of the various backward-
and forward-looking factors would be influenced by present-looking ones-
prevailing social and political norms or consensus about the matter within
the polity," as well as the agenda(s) and perspective(s) of the particular judges
weighing the various considerations. 4
The foregoing analysis is illustrated by the Supreme Court's cases
holding that the Due Process Clause "incorporates" most of the protections of
the Bill of Rights to protect individuals against state invasions of individual
liberties. Palko v. Connecticut,25 which considered whether the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against double jeopardy is applicable to the states, posed
the inquiry in both forward- and backward-looking ways: Is protection against
double jeopardy "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" (forward-
looking)?26 Would trying someone twice for the same crime "violate a
'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental' (backward-looking)? 7 The Court has waffled
between the two kinds of formulations. Considering both historical practice
and abstract principle, PaLko held that the states may constitutionally try a
defendant twice. Reexamining the issue a generation later, the Court held
that double jeopardy is a key feature of ordered liberty." The incorporation
doctrine has been applied in ways that are both forward- and backward-
looking; the sharpness of the doctrine's critical edge has been driven by
22. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 267-
68, 273-75 (1993) (discussing the similarity between the due process antitotalitarian principle and the
anticaste principle of equal protection).
23. Thus, if the statute were being evaluated in the homophobic 1950s, both due process and
equal protection challenges would likely fail. If evaluated in 2000, now that the movement to ostra-
cize gay people has been largely abandoned, the law would probably be invalidated under either
equal protection or due process (lack of procedural safeguards). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972) (finding discrimination in the fundamental right to vote); cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 368-71 (1997) (upholding a civil commitment law because of the many procedural safe-
guards to assure that only guilty people were penalized).
24. This latter factor will typically be decisive only when there is no stable social or politi-
cal equilibrium on the matter, or if the equilibrium is shifting. See infra Part III.
25. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
26. Id. at 325.
27. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
28. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The Warren Court deployed the
incorporation doctrine with a much greater critical edge than prior or subsequent Courts have done.
See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
Destabilizing Due Process
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present-oriented agendas as much as by anything inherent in either the Due
Process Clause or the Court's precedents.
The contingent balance of backward- and forward-looking considera-
tions is also apparent in the Supreme Court's segregation cases decided under
the Equal Protection Clause. Plessy v. Ferguson29 upheld a state segregation
law, reasoning in part that the legislature "is at liberty to act with reference
to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people" in imposing
race-based rules." Brown v. Board of Education3 was a more progressive
approach to equal protection, but it took the Court two generations to
reject Plessy, and only after apartheid had become a national embarrassment
to whites and the national government.32 And Brown's potentially revolu-
tionary antiapartheid rule was moderated by the Court's hesitance in imple-
menting the mandate to desegregate." Although the Court was pretty
aggressive in enforcing the Brown mandate in the 1960s and early 1970s, the
Justices, after 1973, frequently curtailed the authority of the lower courts to
transform school districts into a unitary school system, in deference to the
idea that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools."34 The current Court strongly
emphasizes tradition-based limits on courts' powers to remedy segregation in
public schools."
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment: The Link Between
Arbitrary and Discriminatory Federal Action
The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, has a
due process but not an equal protection clause. The early antidiscrimina-
tion cases against the federal government emphasized this contrast with the
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. Justice John M. Harlan took a more forward-looking approach
to the equal protection guarantee, but his views were expressed in lonely dissent. See id. at 559-
61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public schools and relying on
progressive social science criticisms of apartheid).
32. See Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the
Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
33. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering that implementation
should occur "with all deliberate speed," a mandate the Court did little to enforce until the 1960s).
34. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-90 (1992) (curtailing the court-imposed
restructuring as inconsistent with the old remedial precept that "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy" and with our "vital national tradition" favoring "local auton-
omy of school districts").
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Fourteenth Amendment, which of course has an equal protection clause as
well. Upholding a wartime curfew applicable only to people of Japanese
descent, Hirabayashi v. United States36 reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
"restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a
denial of due process" and found the national defense justifications for the
legislation sufficient to constitute a "rational basis" for the law,37 notwith-
standing its novelty. The Court applied the Hirabayashi approach to a more
severe-and virtually unprecedented-deprivation (forced internment) in
Korematsu v. United States. s
The Court dramatically narrowed the distinction between arbitrariness
(due process) and discrimination (equal protection) in Boiling v. Sharpe 9
Boling held that federal racial segregation of the public schools in the District
of Columbia violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause' on the
same day that the Court held in Brown that state segregation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause." Bolling's reasoning is
inconsistent with the idea that due process is a backward-looking contrast
to equal protection. As the Court put it, "the concepts of equal protection
and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive." 2 Thus, because racial segregation "is not reasonably
related to any proper governmental objective," it imposed on black children
an "arbitrary deprivation of their liberty," in violation of the Due Process
Clause as traditionally understood. 3 The Court also noted that the Due
Process Clause ought not bear an interpretation that allowed the federal
government to maintain segregated schools at the same time that the states
were prohibited from doing so.'
As Karst first pointed out, the Supreme Court after Boiling regularly
treated the precedents applying the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
to police arbitrary race-based policies as interchangeable with the precedents
construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
36. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
37. Id. at 100, 102 (citing and following Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943)).
38. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
39. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
40. See id. at 500.
41. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
42. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. One of the few decisions rejecting a segregationist law during
the Plessy regime was Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), which relied on the Due Process
Clause.
43. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500.
44. See id.
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police race-based discriminations." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefta offi-
cially recognized this practice and held that the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause prohibits the same discriminatory activities engaged in by the
federal government as would be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.4" Although Adarand addressed the fractious issue
of affirmative actioni the dissenters did not challenge the majority's insis-
tence that Fifth Amendment due process and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection exhibit the same forward-looking goal of ending racial
discrimination.48
In short, the Fifth Amendment cases deploy the Due Process Clause's
protection against arbitrary federal action to regulate what the Equal Protec-
tion Clause would consider discriminatory action if taken at the state level. The
leading post-Korematsu cases are forward-looking: They not only invoke critical
considerations, such as theories about how state policies contribute to preju-
dice, but also subject to strict scrutiny federal policies that had been fol-
lowed since the 1860s-segregation of public schools (Boiling) and race-based
remedial policies to benefit people of color (Adarand). Although the idea
suggested by these cases is subversive of the Sunstein thesis, the cases might
be rationalized as responding to a strong desire for coherence in the antidis-
crimination requirements imposed by the Constitution on government at the
federal and the state levels. An examination of the Fourteenth Amendment
cases is therefore useful. Do those cases rehabilitate the thesis of a backward-
looking Due Process Clause working with a forward-looking Equal Protec-
tion Clause?
C. The Fourteenth Amendment: Forward-Looking Due Process and
Backward-Looking Equal Protection Cases
The individual rights provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have
helped transform the state regulatory baselines for many marginalized
Americans. Under the Sunstein thesis, one would expect a large majority
of the transformative cases to have been decided under the Equal Protec-
45. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L.
REv. 541, 554 (1977).
46. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
47. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27.
48. Dissenters conceded that "'both Amendments require the same type of analysis,"' but
argued that "there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that
would be unacceptable for an individual State."' Id. at 253 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (overturning a federal civil service dis-
crimination decision against noncitizens on due process grounds)).
1192
HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1192 1999-2000
Destabilizing Due Process
tion Clause. Many such cases, such as the Warren Court's desegregation
and one-person, one-vote decisions, were usually decided under that clause.
However, just as many transformative cases, such as the Warren Court's
criminal procedure cases and the Burger and Rehnquist Court's abortion
cases, were usually decided under the Due Process Clause. Many were decided
under both clauses. The following survey of six constitutional transforma-
tions suggests that the antiarbitrariness and ordered liberty due process
ideas have been just as tradition shattering as equal protection's nondis-
crimination theme.
1. The Sexual Privacy Cases. The Court's most lenient sexual privacy
case, Buck v. Bell,49 upheld a state law requiring sterilization of people with
mental disabilities. The Court rejected the due process challenge, notwith-
standing the novelty of the statute and its inconsistency with our traditions, for
the forward-looking reason that the law was, in the Court's view, a far-
sighted response to a social problem." The Court in Buck similarly rejected an
equal protection challenge, dismissing it as "the usual last resort of constitu-
tional arguments,"5 but in Skinner v. Oklahoma" struck down an Oklahoma
sterilization law on the equal protection ground that the law deprived people
committing certain crimes of a "basic liberty," while exempting white-collar
criminals."
For the most part, the right of sexual privacy has been recognized under
the Due Process Clause. Its leading articulation is Justice John M. Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. UUman,54 which argued that a law prohibiting the distribu-
tion of birth control devices violates the Due Process Clause. This dissent
illustrates the difficulty of pigeonholing the Due Process Clause as either
backward-looking or forward-looking. The substantive commands of due
process are derived from the balance between "liberty and the demands of
organized society,""5 a relatively abstract concept. The balance is informed
by tradition-but tradition as a "living thing"56 rather than an alienated
past. Citing Skinner and Boling, the dissent recognized that liberty in an
ordered polity requires "freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
49. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
50. "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind." Id. at 207.
51. Id. at 208.
52. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
53. Seeid. at 541.
54. 367 U.S. 497, 541-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 542.
56. Id.
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and purposeless restraints. '" 57 Throughout his opinion, Justice Harlan empha-
sized both backward-looking features guiding judicial judgment, namely, prac-
tices traditionally forbidden in American jurisprudence, and forward-looking
features, namely, the libertarian purposes of having government in the first
place.
In subsequent cases, Court majorities found a constitutional right of
privacy, first teased out of the penumbras of the Bill of Rights," then briefly
enforced under the Equal Protection Clause,59 and finally rerooted in the Due
Process Clause by Roe v. Wade.' The last decision, which finally gave the
right of privacy a constitutional home in Palko and in the Poe dissent, was
also the most radical. Roe overturned the abortion laws that existed in all but
a handful of states--and about half of which had first been enacted before
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.6 Although the Court
defended its sweeping decision historically as well as philosophically, there
has been little dispute from either defenders or critics that Roe was a highly
forward-looking decision. The Court's reaffirmation of a diluted version of Roe
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey62 returned to the Harlan justification of a right
of privacy and came up with a fresh synergy of living history, current values,
and abstract justice to support a right to choose an abortion.
2. The Marriage Cases. Since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
has recognized marriage as fundamental to people living in a polity commit-
ted to ordered liberty. That due process idea has been deployed aggressively
in the last generation. The most radical case was Loving v. Virginia,63 which
invalidated a state law prohibiting different-race marriage. Virginia had never
allowed such marriages, nor had most states until the post-World War II era.
The Court relied on both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses
to invalidate the law, which was an invidious racial discrimination and invaded
a fundamental substantive due process right.' As to the latter ground, a unani-
mous Court said this: "To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable
a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
57. Id. at 543.
58. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. See id. at 175 n.1, 176 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. See id. at 12.
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Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law."' This kind of reasoning strongly recalls the Bolling line of cases.
The Court has applied the right to marry with attention to the Fourteenth
Amendment's overall goals and without regard to the particular constitutional
provision invoked.66 In Zablocki v. Redhail,67 the Court acted under the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate a law requiring deadbeat dads to satisfy their
outstanding support obligations before they could remarry. Apparently apply-
ing the Due Process Clause, the Court in Turner v. Safley6" struck down a regu-
lation limiting the rights of state prisoners to marry. Restrictions on prisoner
marriages have a much better historical pedigree than those on remarriages
by deadbeat dads, but the Court ignored historical justifications and focused
only on whether limiting this important right was needed for present or future
penological objectives.
3. The Criminal Procedure Cases. In 1945, the constitutional rights
afforded criminal defendants varied widely among the several states, in part
because most of the criminal procedural assurances of the federal Bill of Rights
had not been applied by the Supreme Court to the states, as in Palko. Crimi-
nal defendants who were latino or black, poor, or homosexual could expect
rough treatment from the police in the 1950s, and an alarming number of
such defendants were innocent or disproportionately punished for their crimes.
This discriminatory system was attacked under the aegis of the Due Process and
not the Equal Protection Clause.
Between 1949 and 1971, the Supreme Court nationalized the rights of
criminal defendants, by incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause, rendering those rights directly applicable to the states. Among
defendants' rights so nationalized were:
(1) the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
(Fourth Amendment);69
(2) the right not to incriminate oneself (Fifth Amendment);"
65. Id. Recall the Fifth Amendment cases. Loving suggests that the connection between
the due process antiarbitrariness idea and the equal protection antidiscrimination idea is not driven
only by the textual omission in the Fifth Amendment. See Fleming, supra note 22, at 270.
66. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 653 (1980).
67. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
68. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The Court did not specify what constitutional provision was violated
but did emphasize the prison context of the marriage restriction. The lenient test in the prison cases
is derived from the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause.
69. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overnled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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(4) the right to counsel provided by the state if the defendant cannot
afford one (Sixth Amendment);
72
(5) the right to a speedy and public trial (Sixth Amendment);
7
1
(6) the right to confront one's accusers (Sixth Amendment);
74
(7) the right to a jury trial in criminal cases
(Sixth Amendment);75
(8) the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment
(Eighth Amendment);
76
(9) the right to nonexcessive bail (Eighth Amendment).
7
The Warren Court also gave existing protections greater legal bite. For
example, in Mapp v. Ohio, s the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause as
requiring the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.9 Miranda v. Arizona' required the police to apprise the accused that
anything he said could be used against him and that he had a right to coun-
sel."1 The Court also construed due process to prohibit the state from entrap-
ping defendants not otherwise disposed to committing crimes.
8 2
The reasoning in these decisions combined backward-looking and
forward-looking arguments, but their cumulative impact was critical and pro-
gressive. There is legitimate debate as to how much beneficent difference
these decisions made in the real world of police-citizen interaction,3 but there
is scant ground for denying that they reset the baselines for police conduct
in many jurisdictions and were inspired by the forward-looking antiracism
agenda that also inspired Brown. Just as the Fifth Amendment's due process
71. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937)).
72. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel applies even to misdemeanors result-
ing in incarceration of just a single day).
73. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
74. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
75. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
76. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
77. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
78. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
79. See id. at 655-57.
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. See id. at 478-79.
82. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
83. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Per-
spective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998) (criticizing
Miranda); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673 (1992) (same).
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guarantee against arbitrary state action couldenforce the antidiscrimination
norm directly, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process assurance of ordered
liberty could enforce the norm indirectly, by empowering marginalized
people in their interactions with the police.
4. The Rights of Poor People. The 1960s witnessed the birth of a wel-
fare rights movement, whereby liberal reformers engaged in political and legal
activism to reform the welfare system and to obtain better benefits for recipi-
ents." The legal activism included lawsuits invoking constitutional argu-
ments. The Supreme Court rejected most of the equal protection arguments
but accepted some of the due process arguments supporting rights for poor
people. The biggest constitutional victory was Goldberg v. Kelly,"5 which
ruled that the state must afford welfare beneficiaries an adjudicatory hearing
before it can terminate their benefits."' Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court emphasized the dignitary and legitimacy interests that society has in
treating its poor as fairly as it treats its more fortunate citizens and held wel-
fare benefits to be an "entitlement," and therefore "property," rather than a
privilege or gratuity that the state could revoke at its pleasure.87
Goldberg did not hold that the Constitution guarantees poor people
public support, and subsequent equal protection opinions by the Court rejected
challenges to wealth-based classifications disadvantaging poor people.' The
Court has given the Fourteenth Amendment more critical bite against stat-
utes excluding the poor from use of the judicial process through filing fees,
but the bite has just as often come under the Due Process as the Equal
Protection Clause. 9 In Boddie v. Connecticut,9 for example, the Court invoked
84. See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993).
85. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
86. See id. at 264.
87. See id. at 262 n.8, 264-65; see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Although the Court has not applied Goldberg
liberally, it reaffirmed the holding that states cannot assure people of public benefits and then choose
any kind of process to take them away. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542-44 (1985).
88. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). The Equal Protection Clause showed little critical edge, a point made by Justice
Thurgood Marshall's dissenting opinions in both cases. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-100 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See generally Karst, supra note 19, at 29-31; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court
and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights (Part 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 527.
90. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the due process protection of marriage to strike down filing fees for divorces
when the fees barred access for poor people.9"
The leading case is Griffin v. Illinois,92 which invoked the two clauses
in tandem to rule it unconstitutional for the state to charge poor defendants
for assembling the record on appeal if that precluded them from seeking review
of their felony convictions. "Both equal protection and due process empha-
size the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar
of justice in every American court."'93 The Court recently reaffirmed Griffin
in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,94 which held that the state must waive filing fees for
poor people seeking to adjudicate their parental rights on appeal. As in
Griffin, M.L.B. noted concerns with the filing fees under both the Equal
Protection Clause ("the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based
solely on their inability to pay court costs") and the Due Process Clause
("the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state
action")9
5. Women's Rights. Since colonial times, the American states have
discriminated against women, and those discriminations have been chal-
lenged ever since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. One would
reasonably expect that the Equal Protection Clause would have been the
chief venue for challenge and reform, but the early challenges rested on
several parts of the amendment-the Privileges and Immunities Clause,96
the Due Process Clause,97 and the Equal Protection Clause.98 What united
the challenges was not their constitutional source, but their constitutional
result. In all of the cases cited in the margin, the Court upheld exclusions
91. Several concurring Justices treated the bar as a violation of equal protection. See id. at
383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 386-89 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). The
Court in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), rejected an equal protection challenge to filing
fees in bankruptcy proceedings. Ortweinv. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam), refused
to create a due process right for poor people to have appellate fees waived.
92. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93. Id. at 17 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940));
see id. at 21-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing both clauses as well).
94. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
95. Id. at 120. The Court gave greater emphasis to the equal protection feature. See id.
Concurring Justice Anthony M. Kennedy rested his judgment solely on the Due Process Clause.
See id. at 128-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Dissenters argued the inconsistency between any
extension of Boddie and Griffin and the nation's longstanding constitutional traditions. See id. at 129-
44 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
97. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 392-
94 (1915) (finding restrictions on student nurses' hours not to be a due process violation by
restriction of contract freedom).
98. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
210 n.24 (1976).
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of and discriminations against women, usually in opinions laced with pater-
nalistic rhetoric.9
The modem women's liberation movement changed the landscape in
which the Court decided the cases, and official discriminations against
women have diminished in the last generation. Many of the discriminations
did not survive the intermediate equal protection scrutiny the Court adopted
for sex-based classifications. Some feminist scholars maintain, however, that
the abstract equality recognized in those decisions has done women little
concrete good, in part because many of the fallen discriminations disadvan-
taged men rather than women, and in part because heightened scrutiny of
sex-based classifications also imperils policies that meet women's special
needs or remedy historic discriminations against women.1°° Moreover, some
state policies most harmful to women have survived equal protection scru-
tiny in backward-looking or deferential opinions.)°
State rules disadvantaging pregnant women or impeding women in mak-
ing their own choices about when to have children are fundamental
discriminations against women. Many of these discriminations have been
invalidated-almost always under the Due Process Clause. Griswold v.
Connecticut 02 was the death knell for the few remaining laws restricting
women's access to birth control materials, and Roe was a massive judicial
housecleaning of laws preventing women from obtaining abortions."3 Laws
penalizing pregnant women were challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause-but Geduldig v. Aiello" 4 ruled that it is not even sex discrimination,
99. See, e.g., id. at 465-66 (allowing the state to prohibit women from bartending except
in bars owned by their husbands or fathers; recalling "the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare");
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (allowing a state to deny women the right to be
lawyers, as tradition has "always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies
of man and woman," with men as "woman's protector and defender").
100. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 264 (1989); Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1007 (1984); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
101. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (finding constitutional a statute
authorizing men but not women to be registered for the draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that statutory rape laws can apply just to men having sex with underage
Women); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that strong preference for
veterans for state civil service promotion is constitutional even though less than 1.8 percent of its
beneficiaries were women). For a counterpoint to these and other sex discrimination decisions,
see Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. There is support for the idea that Roe should have been decided on equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Karst, supra note 19, at 57-59. This idea makes the
Court's reliance on supposedly backward-looking due process even more remarkable.
104. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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and therefore not an equal protection violation, for a state employer to dis-
criminate on the basis of pregnancy."'5 In contrast, Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleurI°" struck down inflexible employment bars for pregnant women,
on the ground that they created an irrebuttable presumption inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause.' 7 Ironically, in this area of presumed equal pro-
tection dominance, the opinions departing most radically from traditionalist
baselines and actually giving women increased choices were due process deci-
sions like Roe and LaFleur.
6. Gay Rights. My original uneasiness with the distinction between
backward-looking due process and forward-looking equal protection grew
into profound disagreement when I assembled a history of gay rights litigation
in the period after 1961.108 Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals have been sub-
ject to pervasive and sometimes violent state discrimination and pers-
ecution, yet the "forward-looking" equal protection clause had no critical
bite for those groups until the 1990s. I was not surprised to find that the First
Amendment (applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause) some-
times protected gay expression from the 1950s onward, but I was astounded
at how frequently the "backward-looking" Due Process Clause came to the
aid of gay people, and to the aid of cross-dressers and transsexuals who
remain absent in the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Gay-
legal history suggests that the distinction between backward-looking due
process and forward-looking equal protection is not only unsupportable, but
also that the Due Process Clause is more potentially destabilizing than
constitutional scholars generally think, and the Equal Protection Clause as
it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court (especially since 1973) is more
evolutionary than revolutionary.
II. DESTABILIZING DUE PROCESS
The principles for which the Court invokes the Due Process Clause are
rhetorically rooted in western legal tradition, but "tradition" is neither a
105. See id. at 497. The Court's reasoning was that pregnancy-based discrimination divides
the world up into pregnant women versus men and nonpregnant women, whereas sex discrimination
divides the world up into women versus men. See id. at 496 n.20; see also Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) (following Geduldig to interpret antidiscriminatory
violence law to exclude women allegedly attacked by antiabortion activists).
106. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
107. See id. at 651.
108. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Condi-
tions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFsTRA L. REV. 817
(1997). For the shorter version, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 98-137.
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stable nor an entirely backward-looking concept."° Also, whatever their
source, the principles themselves make the Due Process Clause potentially
quite destabilizing. By destabilizing, I mean that judges sometimes deploy
due process to criticize previously acceptable legal rules, including some
longstanding rules supported in varying degrees by Anglo-American
tradition. Roe v. Wade was emphatically destabilizing in this sense-just as
destabilizing as Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia and much
more so than Zablocki v. Rednail and Romer v. Evans, which invalidated
novel and rather unusual statutory discriminations. The gay rights cases, most
of which were brought after 1950, invoked the principles judicially recog-
nized in the Due Process Clause. Although most judges were loathe to give
homosexuals the slightest legal break, the more thoughtful judges reasoned
from due process principles to challenge or overturn unfair antihomosexual
policies that were justified by centuries-old sodomy prohibitions and long-
standing rules against expressions of same-sex attraction or intimacy. Consider
the principles that destabilizing due process wielded to contribute to a shift
in public baselines-from outright state persecution to greater state neutrality
toward gay people.
1. The Principle of Procedural Fairness and the Integrity of State Processes.
A principle suggested by the procedural due process precedents like Goldberg
v. Kelly, the entrapment cases, the exclusionary rule, and the criminal pro-
cedure incorporation decisions is that state process must be procedurally fair
to accused persons. A fair process is one in which state actors neither break
the law themselves nor encourage lawbreaking, the accused person is apprised
of the charges against him and of his constitutional rights, the person has
full opportunity to confront evidence against him, and any state penalty must
be imposed by a neutral decisionmaker providing reasons that are factually
based. The state cannot benefit from sordid practices and cannot bend the
law to persecute socially despised outcasts.
A good many gay people were disciplined by corrupt state actors acting
under questionable procedures, and the political culture was happy to toler-
ate this state of affairs for most of the twentieth century. Some judges stood
against such shenanigans even during the height of the antihomosexual
Kulturkampf of the 1950s and early 1960s. For example, in Kelly v. United
States,"0 Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit disapproved of police entrapment of gay men
109. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993). Justice Harlan
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), referred to tradition as a "living
thing." See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part).
110. 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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and set forth prophylactic evidentiary rules to minimize the risk of abusive
police tactics."' Not only were trial judges instructed to exercise "great
caution" when a charge of sexual solicitation was based on the testimony of
the police officer alone, but a conviction required at least circumstantial
corroboration of the officer's testimony.1 2 In another example, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Bielicki v. Superior Court"3 interpreted the Due Process
Clause and the state constitution to prohibit the police from spying on men
having oral sex within enclosed stalls in public restrooms. Such spying
invaded the "personal right of privacy of the person occupying the stall" and
was an abusive practice."4 With indirect Supreme Court encouragement, other
states followed California's lead."5 While such decisions by no means ended
police stakeouts of public restrooms, they did raise the costs of that long-
standing practice. More importantly, decisions like Bielicki became rallying
points once gay people organized themselves politically in the big cities and
contributed progay baselines in the bargaining process between gay people and
the police."6
Most of the integrity of process cases involved criminal prosecutions,
but an increasing number involved discharges from the armed forces, which
had since 1921 prohibited sexual "degenerates" from serving, and for at least
as long had taken many procedural shortcuts to enforce that rule. Like
hundreds of other women in the 1950s, Corporal Fannie Mae Clackum was
drummed out of military service on unsubstantiated charges that she was a
lesbian. Unlike almost all of the others, she refused to go quietly. Clackum
insisted upon a court-martial hearing so that she could confront the evidence
against her, but all the government was willing to provide was an admin-
istrative hearing, in which the examiner deferred to the judgment of the still-
unnamed accusers. The Court of Claims in Clackum v. United States"7 held
the discharge unlawful under the Due Process Clause, because it was ren-
dered "without any semblance of an opportunity to know what the evidence
against her was, or to face her accusers in a trial or hearing.""'
The next decade saw more gay people follow Clackum's lead, fre-
quently with success. In the 1950s, the armed forces were usually able to purge
111. See id. at 154-55.
112. See id.
113. 371 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1962).
114. Id. at 292.
115. See, e.g., People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); see also Buchanan
v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). California extended its protection to
open stalls in People v. Triggs, 506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973).
116. See Eskridge, supra note 108, at 836-42.
117. 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
118. Id. at 229.
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suspected lesbians by coercing their friends to turn against them. Their friends
would be threatened with expulsion from the military if they did not cooper-
ate. This tactic came under fire in the 1960s. In 1968, the Mattachine
Society of Washington (MSW) learned that the army was preparing a purge
of alleged lesbians at two bases in the D.C. area. The organization went into
action-notifying the commanding officers that MSW and the press were
monitoring the situation, leafletting the bases with pamphlets detailing one's
procedural rights during a federal investigation, and representing two women
ultimately accused. Insisting on every iota of due process, the women were
cleared for lack of evidence; only women who cooperated with the investi-
gators were expelled."9
2. Ordered Liberty and the Privacy Principle. Palko v. Connecticut's idea
of ordered liberty insists that the state not adopt policies that restrict people's
freedoms, especially when only a minority's freedoms are restricted, unless jus-
tified by genuinely important public needs. Griswold v. Connecticut was heir
to this idea and contributed to the destabilization of longstanding state laws
criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults. To begin with, Griswold
was the occasion for a new ally to join the homophile cause: the national
ACLU, which in 1957 had publicly acquiesced in the constitutionality of
consensual sodomy laws. 2° After Griswold, the ACLU adopted the position
that private consensual behavior between two people of the same sex ought
not be illegal.
Griswold also gave gay people and their allies freshly credible constitu-
tional arguments that required judicial attention be directed toward consen-
sual sodomy laws. Although the Supreme Court was unreceptive to privacy
arguments protecting same-sex sodomy, some federal judges found them per-
suasive,'2' as have an increasing number of state judges. The New York Court
of Appeals invalidated its state consensual sodomy law in People v. Onofre,'
2
holding that the due process right to privacy is not limited to marriage and
procreation-based activities but rather is "a right of independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct
oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmental
119. See Franklin Kameny, WAC's Prevail Over Army, LADDER, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 7.
120. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 212-13 (1983).
121. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge
court) (upholding Virginia's sodomy law, over dissent by Judge Merhige), affd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976) (mem.); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (three-judge court)
(striking down Texas sodomy law), vacated sub nom. Buchanan v. Wade, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (mem.).
Doe was criticized in Karst, supra note 19, at 65.
122. 415 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1980).
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restraint. 123 Although the Supreme Court rejected this reading of the pri-
vacy right in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Onofre reading has arguably been more
influential. Not only have most states decriminalized sodomy between con-
senting adults, but an increasing number of states are doing so by judicial
invocation of a state constitutional right of privacy-including the Georgia
Supreme Court, which in 1998 struck down the sodomy law that the U.S.
Supreme Court had found sufficiently justified.
124
To be sure, the virtual unanimity of courts on this matter in recent years
might be viewed as a judicial cleaning-up operation, ridding states of laws
that had become embarrassments, rather than as any kind of policy revolu-
tion. Nonetheless, the privacy decisions listed in the margin have destabi-
lized longstanding policies in traditionalist states whose legislatures would not
have acted on their own. Privacy has also had critical bite in more liberal
states. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, extended Onofre to
invalidate the law prohibiting anyone from loitering in a public place for
the purpose of soliciting another person for "deviate sexual intercourse,"" 5 a
pretty bold deployment of due process given widespread agreement that the
state has authority to regulate public displays of sexuality.
3. Vagueness and the Antiobsolescence Principle. The Due Process Clause
makes it unconstitutional for the state to hold people accountable for violat-
ing laws that do not articulate precisely what conduct is allowed and what is
forbidden. The Supreme Court's most interesting application of the vagueness
doctrine, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 126 invalidated a municipal vagrancy
law of the sort that were common since the colonial era and whose precise
language had originated in mid-nineteenth century ordinances. The opinion
of the Court bristled with forward-looking analysis, for the ordinance was
being deployed by the police to harass people of color, interracial couples
such as the defendants in Papachristou, and other "nonconformists.',2 7 The
vice of vague laws under Papachristou was not just their failure to give notice
to citizens of what the law required, but also the excessive discretion they
vested in police officers. I would draw a further principle from the case: Many
of the laws with the deepest roots in tradition have become obsolescent as
123. Id. at 939.
124. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). For other decisions invalidating state
sodomy laws on privacy grounds, see Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (relying on
equal protection); Louisiana v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Gryczan v. Montana,
942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); and Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
125. People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983).
126. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
127. See id. at 164, 169-70.
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times have changed, and the Due Process Clause is a vehicle to weed out
obsolescent laws or at least force the legislature to update them. This last
idea animated vagueness challenges made by gay, bisexual, and transgen-
dered people.
Many state sodomy laws were prime candidates for similar challenges,
as they were adopted in the nineteenth century, criminalized only the highly
open-ended "crime against nature," and were enforced in arbitrary and
resource-wasting ways. The first major decision accepting this argument
was Harris v. State."' The Alaska Supreme Court held that the phrase "crime
against nature" had little meaning to the typical citizen and reflected the stat-
ute's endorsement of an obsolescent natural law rather than a secular basis
for regulating sexuality.29 The court also relied on current attitudes, which
were more libertarian that those of bygone years. "IThe widening gap
between our formal statutory law and the actual attitudes and behavior of
vast segments of our society can only sow the seeds of increasing disrespect
for our legal institutions."3 ' Several other states applied this kind of due
process reasoning to strike down their "crime against nature," ' "unnatural and
lascivious acts,"''32 "solicitation for deviate sexual intercourse,' 33 "lewd or inde-
cent acts," '34 and "public indecency" laws.135
The most dramatic invocation of the vagueness doctrine came in the
lawsuits challenging laws criminalizing cross-dressing. Beginning in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, many cities and a few states adopted laws mak-
ing it a crime for a person to appear in public "in a dress not belonging to his
or her sex." '36 Almost from the beginning, these laws were deployed to harass
gender, and then sexual, nonconformists-men-renouncing women, male
"fairies" who paraded in women's attire, working class "butch" lesbians, drag
128. 457 P.2d 638, 647 (Alaska 1969).
129. See id. at 645.
130. Id.
131. See Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (per curiam). But cf. Thomas v. State,
326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975) (retaining the misdemeanor for "unnatural and lascivious acts").
132. See Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1974) (construing the law
narrowly under the due process rule of lenity).
133. See City of Columbus v. Scott, 353 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); State v. Sharpe,
205 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965); cf. State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio 1979) (constru-
ing a new state antisolicitation law narrowly).
134. See District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332 (D.C. 1974).
135. See In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
136. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 27-29 (quoting the Chicago ordinance). On these laws
and their application, see generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 27-29, 338-41 app. A2 (catalogu-
ing cities with such laws); id. at 378-80 app. C4 (listing arrests in one city, St. Louis).
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queens, and (most recently) transsexuals. Papachristou gave gender-benders
and their ACLU allies winning arguments against police harassment. Rep-
resentative was the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in City of Columbus v.
Rogers,3 7 which overturned the conviction of a male cross-dresser on the
ground that the ordinance was vague. The court's opinion stressed that dress
is a particularly malleable social convention, indeed one that was more
sexually indeterminate than ever before. 13' Because the ordinance rested upon
outmoded assumptions, its antiquity proved its undoing, rather than its sal-
vation, under a rather forward-looking and critical reading of the Due Process
Clause. Judges invoked Rogers-type reasoning to strike down cross-dressing
ordinances in Chicago, St. Louis, and a number of other cities. 139 After about a
decade of litigation, virtually all of the nation's laws criminalizing cross-
dressing had been swept away by the Due Process Clause.
4. Structural Due Process and Principles of Nondelegation and Institutional
Competence. The Due Process Clause has a structural dimension that justifies
judicial review that monitors policies to ensure they are made by the most
legitimate decisionmaker in a procedurally accountable way."4 One feature
of structural due process is the nondelegation principle: the idea that impor-
tant policy decisions should be made by the most democratically appropriate
institutions. The nondelegation principle is the best justification for the rule
of lenity which courts sometimes deploy to construe ambiguous penal statutes
in favor of those penalized. Although the rule of lenity is traditionally asso-
ciated with the antivagueness feature of due process, it might be better
conceptualized as a judicial refusal to update criminal statutes and an insis-
tence that the legislature alone has the capacity to make those moral
judgments.14 '
At the height of antihomosexual sentiment in this country, the rule of
lenity was one of the few constitutional protections gay people (sporadically)
enjoyed. For example, New York City magistrates engaged in a campaign
in the 1950s to rebuff police entrapment of gay and bisexual men by inter-
137. 324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975).
138. See id. at 565.
139. See D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cit. 1986); City of Chicago v. Wilson,
389 N.E.2d 522 (Il1. 1978); ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 412 nn.41-42 (listing other cases).
140. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 485-506 (2d ed. 1995); Hans
A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). For a related idea, see Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991).
141. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345.
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preting the state disorderly conduct law to require officers to show an actual
breach of the peace rather than just a conversation suggesting sexual interest
in an undercover decoy.'42 The most dramatic example of the rule of lenity
came a generation later in Pryor v. Municipal Court.'43 The defendant was
arrested for soliciting a decoy cop to engage in oral intercourse and charged
with "lewd vagrancy," a misdemeanor that had been the chief ground for
arresting gay and bisexual men in California for three generations. Notwith-
standing the law's roots in state tradition, its narrowing by the legislature in
1961, and efforts by lower courts to define its ambit, the court ruled the law
was impermissibly vague.' Having faulted the law's vagueness, the court
declined to strike it from the books, but instead limited the law to the solici-
tation of sexual conduct that would occur in a public place, or to sexual
touching if the actor knows or should know of the presence of persons who
would probably be offended by that kind of conduct.4 '
A related feature of structural due process is the institutional compe-
tence principle: In a government of complex and overlapping responsibili-
ties, the courts can prevent incapable institutions from implementing sweeping
and unjust policies. The rule of lenity can be justified under this principle
as well as the principle of nondelegation. Judges do not have the moral train-
ing or the democratic legitimacy to make important punitive decisions for
the country. The principles of nondelegation and of institutional competence
proved highly destabilizing in one of the areas of law most impervious to
equal protection challenge-immigration and naturalization policy. For
most of the twentieth century, the federal government discriminated against
gender-bending and so-called degenerate aliens seeking to enter and stay
in this country and, after 1940, seeking citizenship here."4 In the wake of
Griswold, Judge Walter Mansfield leniently interpreted the "good moral char-
acter" requirement in law governing naturalization to be no bar to admitted
homosexuals,'47 a remarkable opinion in which the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) later acquiesced."
142. See, e.g., People v. Feliciano, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1958); People v.
Strauss, 114 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1952).
143. 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979).
144. See id. at 641. The law left gay men at the mercy of police, at odds with Papachristou's
warning against laws applied only to minorities. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 171 (1972) ("The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities.., is the
great mucilage that holds society together.").
145. See Pryor, 599 P.2d at 646.
146. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 35-36, 69-70, 132-34.
147. See In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
148. See Immigration Department Relaxes Gay Policy, ADVOCATE, Sept. 22, 1976, at 10 (quot-
ing Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum).
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Judge Mansfield's opinion had no effect on the separate statute that
governed entry into this country. The latter had been interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Boutilier v. INS' to include bisexual and gay people as
"persons afflicted with psychopathic personality" who were barred from entry.
The nondelegation principle was not available as a limiting rule, because the
Court found that Congress-and not just the Public Health Service (PHS) and
the INS that jointly administered the law-had made the policy choices that
were the basis for the exclusion. 5' Over the next half-generation, however,
the institutional competence principle destabilized this exclusion as well. The
key development was the reversal of the psychiatric profession, which in the
1960s designated bisexual and gay people as mentally diseased, but which
rejected that stance in the mid-1970s. Once that happened, the medical pro-
fessionals in the PHS refused to cooperate in certifying gay and bisexual
people as "psychopathic"-a development that threw the scheme into tur-
moil, because the law assumed the psychopathic personality exclusion would
be based upon a medical examination."' The Ninth Circuit construed the
statute to bar the INS-acting without the cooperation of the PHS-from
excluding gay and bisexual people on the ground that it was not competent to
make a medical decision.' Although the INS continued to give lip service
to the antigay exclusion, it was effectively dead, and Congress repealed it
without controversy in 1990.53 At the end of the day, the twin principles of
structural due process-nondelegation and institutional competence-had
destabilized and ultimately felled two discriminations that had been part of
American immigration and naturalization policies since their statutory
incipiencies.
5. The Antiarbitrariness Principle. Gay men and lesbians were barred from
state and federal civil service employment and from the armed forces for
most of the twentieth century. Due to the pressures of the closet, it was not
until the 1960s that lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men challenged these exclu-
sions on their merits. Ironically, all of the early cases in which plaintiffs won
were decided under the due process antiarbitrariness principle, whereby
government decisions must be rationally related to public-regarding goals.
The leading decision was Chief Judge David L. Bazelon's opinion for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Norton v. Macy,'54 involving the dis-
149. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
150. See id. at 120-23 (arguing that these were in fact Congress's decisions).
151. See Eskridge, supra note 108, at 934-39 (describing the bizarre bureaucratic maneuver-
ing that followed the Public Health Service's abandonment of its role).
152. See Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983).
153. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 601(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994).
154. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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charge of a NASA budget analyst for "immoral conduct" because he admitted
to police officers that he was gay. The court found no obvious relationship
between Clifford L. Norton's sexual orientation and his ability to do his
job"'55 and ruled, further, that the Civil Service Commission's abstract vision
of morality was too broad and beyond its competence and was inconsistent
with the statutory mandate, the efficiency of the service.'56 Explicitly invok-
ing Griswold,'" Norton all but held that private conduct and homosexual
orientation are irrelevant to federal employment. Subsequent litigation
impelled the Commission to rethink its exclusion of lesbian and gay govern-
ment employees. Soon after a district court issued an injunction upon finding
that such a blanket exclusion was arbitrary under the Due Process Clause, 9
the Commission rescinded the policy, first in a 1973 bulletin and then in a
formal rule barring federal agencies from disciplining gay people for their
private conduct, unless the conduct 'affects job fitness."'' ' 6
Norton's "nexus" requirement destabilized not only the longstanding fed-
eral civil service exclusion of gay people, but similar exclusions elsewhere.
Gay people denied security clearances because of their sexual orientation
sued under Norton and sometimes won some kind of relief.6 ' State employ-
ees also invoked the nexus requirement in challenging their discharge.
Following Norton, the California Supreme Court led the way in deploying
due process to challenge state employment exclusions.'62 Perhaps most sur-
prisingly, the longstanding military exclusion of lesbians, gay men, and bisexu-
als came under due process fire. Applying the nexus requirement in the
military setting, the District of Columbia Circuit held in Matlovich v. Secretary
of the Air Force'63 that the Air Force was required to give reasons for separat-
ing a gay sergeant who concededly had an exemplary service record, while
not separating many others who were gay or had engaged in prohibited
conduct."6 Unlike the civil service exclusion, however, the military exclusion
155. See id. at 1167.
156. See id. at 1167 & n.28. Note the debt the argument in the text owes to the structural due
process idea of institutional competence.
157. See id. at 1164 n.10.
158. See id. at 1168.
159. See Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(following Norton), aff d on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975).
160. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 n.14, 256 n.15 (9th
Cir. 1976) (explaining the process of the Commission's shift and quoting the bulletin and the rule).
161. See, e.g., Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Gayer Gets
Clearance, ADVOCATE, Oct. 8, 1975, at 9. The security clearance exclusion was revoked in 1995.
162. See Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977) (en banc); Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
163. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
164. See id. at 860; see also Berg v. Claytor, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reaching a similar
result in a lawsuit against the Navy).
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did not collapse under judicial scrutiny. The Carter Administration
reformulated the exclusion, limiting discretion to retain any gay person within
the military and insisting that the exclusion was needed to maintain disci-
pline and good order in the armed forces. Starting with Beller v. Middendorf,'65
the courts of appeals rejected broad challenges to the policy arguments that
litigants brought under the Fifth Amendment, including the equal protec-
tion component.
6. The Principle of Dignity. Perhaps the most fundamental value found
in the Due Process Clause is the idea that the state is obligated to treat
every person as a presumptively worthwhile human being who is entitled to
respect and humane treatment.' 6  This principle is a key reason Buck v. Bell
and Korematsu v. United States were wrongly decided: The state was imple-
menting policies that gave no regard to either the humanity or the actual
context of the persons who were its objects. The state's demonization of
"degenerates," "homosexuals and sex perverts," cross-dressers, lesbians, and
gay men in the last century similarly denied dignity to its objects. The gay
rights movement recognized this in 1961 when it publicly declared as its twin
goals "[to equalize the status and position of the homosexual with those of
the heterosexual" and "[tlo secure for the homosexual the right, as a human
being, to develop and achieve his full potential and dignity, and the right as
a citizen, to make his maximum contribution to the society in which he
lives."'67
The principle of dignity has been implicit in some American cases. Les-
bians, gay men, and bisexuals have children, often in the context of a mar-
riage to someone of a different sex. Such marriages typically dissolve at some
point, which often raises issues of child custody and visitation. Traditionally,
American states presumed against custody by lesbian, gay, or bisexual parents
and imposed stringent limitations on their visitation rights.' 6 This policy
lacked any kind of fact-based foundation, as studies have found that lesbian
and gay parents are just as good at raising children as straight parents, and it
was largely based on social prejudice against bisexual and gay people.'69 State
165. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cit. 1980).
166. See Karst, supra note 19, at 5-11; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 752-54 (1989).
167. Constitution of the Mattachine Society of Washington, art. 11, § 1(b)-(c).
168. See, e.g., Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Bennett v.
Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1973). See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 889-90 (1979).
169. See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science,
and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (responding to Lynn D. Wardle, The Poten-
tial Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833); see also ESKRIDGE, supra
note 12, at 211-15.
47 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1183 (2000)1210
HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1210 1999-2000
Destabilizing Due Process
courts have been rethinking the antigay presumptions for the last genera-
tion. Their decisions have generally not been justified by reference to con-
stitutional norms, but such norms are surely relevant and are probably a key
reason state high courts have, one by one, been renouncing the old presump-
tions and insisting that the only criterion is the best interest of the child. 7'
The constitutional underpinnings of a gay-neutral approach could be expressed
in either equal protection (antidiscrimination) or due process (antiarbitrari-
ness) terms, but the core idea is respect for human dignity. The opportunity
to care for children ought not cavalierly be denied to gay people, because
this would both deprive the child of a loving caretaker and deprive the par-
ent of a unique mode of human flourishing.
The principle of dignity has been more explicit in other countries. For
example, it was the focus of the decision of the Constitutional Court to invali-
date South Africa's laws prohibiting sodomy and unnatural acts between
men.' The challengers emphasized equality-based arguments, but the Justices
chided them for not giving the same emphasis to the liberty-based argu-
ments under the constitutional rights to dignity and privacy in that nation's
constitution.
The fact is that both from the point of view of the persons affected,
as well as from that of society as a whole, equality and privacy cannot
be separated, because they are both violated simultaneously by anti-
sodomy laws. In the present matter, such laws deny equal respect for
difference, which lies at the heart of equality, and becomes the basis
for the invasion of privacy. At the same time, the negation by the
state of different forms of intimate personal behaviour becomes the
foundation for the repudiation of equality. Human rights are better
approached and defended in an integrated rather than a disparate
fashion. The rights must fit the people, not the people the rights.
This requires looking at rights and their violations from a persons-
centered rather than a formula-based position, and analysing them
contextually rather than abstractly."
This kind of thinking, which epitomizes Ken Karst's constitutional philoso-
phy, is fatal to a scholastic distinction between backward-looking due process
(privacy and dignity) and forward-looking equal protection.
170. See, e.g., In re Marriage of R.S. and S.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Boswell
v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
171. See National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, Wits Law School (vis-
ited May 28, 200) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/lawreps.html>, reported in 1998 (1) BCLR 1517 (CC).
172. Id. at 112 (separate opinion of Sachs, J.).
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III. THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DESTABILIZING DUE
PROCESS AND EVOLUTIVE EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR MINORITY GROUPS
The gay rights cases illustrate the richness of the due process tradition
and its multifarious potential for destabilizing legal rules and practices,
including longstanding and even once-entrenched rules and practices. One
is even tempted to agree with Justice Frankfurter's claim that "'[dJue process'
is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history
and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society."1"
The gay experience with constitutional litigation also tempts one to ask what
the Equal Protection Clause adds to the many doctrinal and conceptual
protections of the Due Process Clause. Here are some possibilities.
1. The Unnecessary Equal Protection Clause? Recall the Fifth Amend-
ment cases, which suggest that the antiarbitrariness principle of the Due
Process Clause can "incorporate" the antidiscrimination principle of the
Equal Protection Clause. Gaylegal history, especially the successful challenges
to exclusions from federal and state employment, lends support to this
intuition: Due process's requirement that state policies not be arbitrary can
have substantial bite for a despised minority. The gay rights cases could
also support the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause has tradition-
ally had no bite for this minority.
There remain many federal, state, and local rules that explicitly discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation, and many others that effectively do
So.' Most of these rules were originally justified on the basis of either hatred
of "homosexuals" or erroneous stereotypes about gay people, and they are now
justified on the basis of factually weak pretexts or a symbolic stance that
removing discriminations will "promote homosexuality."'75 Yet, as of January
2000, we can count on one hand the number of explicit sexual-orientation
discriminations that have been invalidated by an appellate court on the basis
of federal or state equal protection provisions alone,'76 and we would need
lots of hands to count the decisions rejecting equal protection challenges
brought by lesbian, gay, and bisexual litigants against openly discriminatory
policies. The latter include decisions upholding against equal protection
173. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
174. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 139-48, 362-71 app. B3 (listing current rules).
175. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: Judicial Review, Social Norms, and the
Politics of Preservation, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2000).
176. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993);
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864 (Vt. 1999). I am tempted also to include Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
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attack the federal government's exclusion of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men
from the armed forces,'77 federal and state discrimination against gay and
bisexual people in employment,' federal discrimination in issuing security
clearances,'79 state and federal toleration of violent antigay harassment by
government co-workers, 180 state bars to same-sex marriages,'' state bars to
adoption of children by gay people,12 state sodomy laws that criminalize only
same-sex sodomy, 3 and local and state intiatives revoking laws protecting
gay men, bisexuals, and lesbians from violence and discrimination.'84 Some
antigav policies-such as state statutes requiring public schools to teach that
homosexuality is disapproved' or prohibiting educators from "suggest[ing]"
that "some methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex" a6-have
not even yielded an equal protection challenge at the appellate level.
Not only have courts failed to give the Equal Protection Clause forward-
looking application to gay rights claims in the twentieth century, but the
Supreme Court has gone out of its way to discriminate against lesbian, gay,
and bisexual rights. Bowers v. Hardwick is the most famous example. The
Burger Court upheld a gay-neutral sodomy law by focusing only on its regu-
lation of "homosexual sodomy."'87 A more striking discrimination was the
Warren Court's decision in Boutilier v. INS, whose reasoning rested on three
discriminatory leaps of logic: the statutory term "psychopathic personality"
(1) included a person whose doctors swore without rebuttal was not psycho-
pathic, (2) simply because that person was a "homosexual," (3) a term the
177. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4; see also Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1999);
Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Military Forces and Personnel of the House Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 322 (1993) (state-
ment of Cass R. Sunstein) (noting that the Court will apply the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment deferentially, to allow Congress to exclude openly gay people from the armed forces).
178. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997); Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cit. 1987); Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
179. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. DISCO, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
180. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (mem.) (opinion reproduced at
Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1992)).
181. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
182. See State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Ha. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), vacated in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
183. See Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77,372 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). State decisions striking
down sodomy laws have done so exclusively or mainly on the basis of the privacy right.
184. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cit. 1997) (distinguishing
Evans), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
185. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (Supp. 1992).
186. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 15-716(C)(3) (Supp. 1991).
187. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1988). The Burger Court gave antigay
spins in its obscenity cases, for example, Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977), and in its vagueness
cases, for example, Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), as well.
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Court assumed to include apparent bisexuals such as Clive Michael Boutilier.'18
Although the Rehnquist Court has not yet handed down a decision as openly
discriminatory as either Boutilier or Hardwick, its constitutional jurisprudence
has deployed the First Amendment vigorously to thwart state antidiscrimi-
nation legislation when it protects gay people,'89 but anemically when federal
censorship of lesbian and gay art" or gay deployment of the "Olympics" termi-
nology"' were in issue.
The gay experience can be generalized to support an inversion of the
Carolene Products-inspired theory of equal protection:92 When a minority
group is truly marginalized in the political process because of the overwhelm-
ing power of social prejudice, the Supreme Court will not aggressively deploy
the Equal Protection Clause to protect the group. The most that powerless
minorities can expect is that the Court will wield the libertarian features of the
Constitution-the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment-to desta-
bilize some of the more extreme or vicious policies that persecute or disadvan-
tage the group. Recall that the Equal Protection Clause was no great friend
to women, people from Asia, and the freed slaves and their descendants so
long as there was a national consensus that women belonged at home rearing
children, Asians were an alien race, and blacks were morally and intellectu-
ally inferior to whites.
2. The Wholesale Equal Protection Clause and Group Rights. While the
hypothesis of an unnecessary Equal Protection Clause explains the first two
generations of gay rights cases relatively well, more recent litigation suggests
that it, like the Sunstein hypothesis, is too simple. The Equal Protection
Clause showed some bite in Romer v. Evans and in two recent state same-
sex marriage decisions: Baehr v. Lewin,'93 in which the Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled the exclusion of same-sex couples to be sex discrimination but remanded
for trial to determine the validity of the state's justifications, and Baker v.
188. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1990), for a detailed analysis of Boutilier.
189. Compare Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that the state cannot require a private parade to allow openly gay members), with Roberts v.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the state can require a private club to admit female members).
190. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
191. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987).
192. For an explication of the Carolene Products theory, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 (1980) (drawing from United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). The inversion of Carolene Products was first
suggested in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 53-56 (1994).
193. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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State,194 in which the Vermont Supreme Court ruled the exclusion to be
sexual-orientation discrimination that failed Evans-style rational basis, but
remanded to the legislature to equalize benefits and obligations through a same-
sex partnership or marriage law. Like Loving v. Virginia, all of these cases
could have been decided under the Due Process Clause of the federal or (for
the latter two decisions) state constitutions.9 5 But, like Brown v. Board of
Education,96 they were not. There are good reasons for that.
One kind of reason is backward-looking. At its birth, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was aimed specifically at protecting the rights of the freed slaves
and their descendants but was also aimed, more generally, at discouraging
"class legislation."' 97 Some of the early cases objected to laws and legal prac-
tices that treated groups of citizens unequally because of social prejudices
against them.'8 The original goal and these early cases suggest a group
focus for equal protection that is largely absent in the due process tradition.
The equal protection tradition has evolved into one in which people lumped
together for purposes of legal exclusion and discrimination have come to see
themselves as a "minority group." This is also a forward-looking reason sup-
porting a special role for the Equal Protection Clause: It distinctively reflects
the polity's aspiration that people will be treated as individuals and not as part
of a pariah class, and it distinctively captures the aspirations of minority
group people themselves.
Gaylegal history offers a perfect mise-en-sc~ne for this idea. Dr. Franklin
Kameny was fired from his federal government job in 1957 because he was a
suspected "homosexual," and he sued to get his job back. His lawyers chal-
lenged the discharge on due process grounds and lost. Kameny wrote his
own petition for certiorari, which emphasized the denial of equal protec-
tion. This was a heartfelt argument from a man who felt his treatment was
not only an affront to himself, but also to a whole group of people unfairly
stigmatized by the government as well as by society. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari, but immediately thereafter Kameny founded the Matta-
chine Society of Washington, emphasizing the group as well as the individual
194. 744 A.2d 864, 883-86 (Vt. 1999).
195. Because they applied an equal protection rational basis standard with some bite, both Evans
and Baker could have rested on the antiarbitrariness principle of the Due Process Clause. Both
Baehr and Baker could have rested upon the due process right to marry-which would have been
broader grounds for the decision than the equal protection grounds invoked by those courts.
196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown's emphasis on a fundamental right to a decent education
could have justified invalidation of public school segregation on due process grounds.
197. See Karst, supra note 19, at 11-17; Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legisla-
don, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997).
198. See Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Prejudice, Normative Equilibrium, and Equal Protection of
the Law (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the UCLA Law Review).
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discriminatory impact of antigay rules and policies. '99 The lesson is that once
a collection of similarly situated people see themselves as a minority group,
they will not be satisfied making just due process arguments, which chip
away at isolated policies denying individuals important rights. The stigmatized
people will want to make equal protection arguments as part of an effort to
form a group consciousness."
The Supreme Court rhetorically minimizes the group-based origins and
history of the Equal Protection Clause, but its practice has only reinforced
the determination of minorities to see their group-based rights as bound up
more with equal protection. This is because the Court's apparent classification-
based approach offers a tremendous reward for groups that can persuade
judges that the classification legally defining their group is suspect, like race or
ethnicity, or quasi-suspect, like sex or illegitimacy. If the group can make that
case to the Court, the Equal Protection Clause potentially empowers the
group to challenge discriminatory policies across the board. Any policy-
including the apportionment of benefits as well as penalties-that differentiates
is subject to challenge. Thus it is that regular equal protection and due process
scrutiny might be either interchangeable or interdependent at the retail level,
that is, in challenges to particular discriminations, especially penalty-based
ones. But the Equal Protection Clause alone offers a minority group a poten-
tial constitutional jackpot at the wholesale level, that is, in challenges to an array
of interconnected discriminations in state benefits as well as burdens. For
people of color, that interconnected array is called apartheid; for women,
separate spheres; for gay people, don't ask, don't tell-an apartheid of the
closet.
3. Evolutive Equal Protection. Just as the first hypothesis made the Equal
Protection Clause seem too marginal, so the second may represent it as too
radical. While minority groups would like the Court to lead the way in
wholesale invalidation or revision of legal disabilities disadvantaging them,
the Court's incentives are different. Consistent with my inversion of Carolene
Products, the present Court tends to stick to the retail level (under either the
Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause) and is reluctant to strike down
particular discriminations so long as the minority group is totally marginal-
ized and powerless. As gaylaw illustrates, the Court may even add to the
199. See David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citizens": Washington's Gay Community Confronts
the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall-Winter 1994-95, at 55-56 (discussing Kameny v. Brucker,
365 U.S. 843 (1961), denying cert. to 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960)). The Mattachine Society of
Washington's principles are quoted above. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
200. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
175-77 (1976). Due process arguments can also serve this purpose, especially in the context of class
actions, but the connection between the group and the constitutional assurance is closer with the
Equal Protection Clause.
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formal discriminations by rewriting ambiguous legal texts to make them con-
sistent with the perceived national consensus. Once an historically excluded
group shows political clout and cultural and economic resonance, however,
the Court becomes sensitive to discriminations against the group and increas-
ingly willing to nullify some such discriminations at the retail level, but remains
unenthusiastic about insisting on radical, or wholesale, revisions. Such revi-
sions would be risky for the Court, because people whose status or values
depend on discriminating against the minority group will be riled by any big
constitutional entitlement for the group. The Court's current strategy is to
send up trial balloons and to see what happens.
The undertheorized opinion in Evans was such a trial balloon, an invi-
tation but not an insistence that lower courts and the political process rethink
some antigay discriminations. Baker, the same-sex marriage case, was the
Vermont Supreme Court's trial balloon. The court did not insist on same-sex
marriage but did require the legislature to find a way to end the pervasive
discrimination against same-sex couples that the marriage bar creates. Note
the key role that the political background assumes. It is not apparent that
the Rehnquist Court would be willing to impose Baker on a national level,
notwithstanding the Vermont court's cogent reliance on Evans. One reason
is that even as our national political equilibrium in favor of jailing gay
people has collapsed, there is still a consensus against recognizing same-sex
unions. In contrast, the latter consensus has collapsed in many of the nation's
large cities and perhaps also in Vermont, a progressive and tolerant state.
Hence, the same principles of equal protection will mean something different
in Vermont than they do in Virginia and, for the time being, in One First
Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C.
But that, too, might change. Ten years ago, state recognition of same-sex
unions was unthinkable; today it is thinkable, and Vermont has just recog-
ized such unions.0 1  What will the political consensus be in 2010? If it
continues to move in a progay direction, Evans might turn out to be for
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals what Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada2 was
for people of color and Reed v. Reed °3 was for women-a cautious and
imprecise equal protection trial balloon followed by bolder rulings. If the
political consensus remains stable or even turns in an antigay direction,
Evans could be a gaylegal equivalent of Goldberg v. Kelly2 -a trial balloon
201. See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H. 847, 1999-2000 Legis. (Vt. 2000).
202. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (striking down a state refusal to allow a black person to attend a
state law school).
203. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a state law preferring men over women to administer
estates).
204. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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followed by judicial retreat. Although I am optimistic that the obvious produc-
tivity of gay and bisexual people and the factual and moral weaknesses of
antigay claims will undermine the legitimacy of state discrimination against
this group, it is surely too early to say how robust the Equal Protection
Clause will be for sexual minorities.
At a general level, the interconnection between the destabilizing Due
Process Clause, an evolutive Equal Protection Clause, and a shifting political con-
sensus looks something like this:
Due Process Equal Protection Illustrations
Consensus Individuals in the A similar role, Compare Yick
Stigmatizing minority group are policing Wo with
the Minority occasionally particularly harsh Korematsu
Group as protected against discriminations but (ethnicity);
Disgusting or unfair state action generally deferring Plessy with
Threatening and punitive to social norms. Buchanan (race);
policies that go Boutilier with
"too far." Clackum
(sexuality).
Stigmatizing More aggressive A similar role, with Powell and
Consensus review of judicial trial Gaines (race);
Eroded, particular policies balloons to Griswold (sex
Politics (especially consider whether and sexuality);
Moving punitive ones) more wholesale Reed (sex); Evans
Toward under due process review should be and Baker
Toleration or principles and attempted. (sexual
Accommoda- deferring less to orientation).
tion traditional norms.
Consensus Aggressive, often Wholesale scrutiny Compare Brown
Recognizing highly of express with Pitts (race);
the Minority destabilizing discriminations Roe and Craig
Group as review of arbitrary (including those with Feeney
Normal or at policies and affecting state (sex).
Least a outmoded benefits as well as
Partner in practices penalties), but less
Pluralism (especially searching review of
punitive policies discriminations
and practices). that reflect closeted
animus or
indifference.
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The above table merely formalizes the intuition at the beginning of this
essay. How the courts deploy either the Due Process or the Equal Protection
Clause will be informed by a comparable mix of backward-looking, forward-
looking, and present-minded considerations.
The table also provides a caution against making too much of my main
distinction between the two clauses, namely, the relatively greater potential
the Equal Protection Clause has to destabilize state policies discriminating
in benefits as well as burdens, and the role this possibility assumes in the
cultural formation of a minority group consciousness. There may be no deep
theoretical or even historical reason why the Due Process Clause's princi-
ples of fairness, antiarbitrariness, and dignity could not be applied on the
wholesale level, as I am using the term. Indeed, a great contribution Ken
Karst has made to constitutional theory is to insist that both the Due Process
and the Equal Protection Clauses be read as guarantees fulfilling the promise
of citizenship made in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the spirit of Karstian constitutionalism, the focus should be on principles of
both freedom and equality, not scholastic doctrinal distinctions.
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